To, jestli stát příjme svá pravidla pro rozpočtovou zodpovědnost či na sebe nechá uvalit tato pravidla z vnějšku, může hrát roli, alespoň podle ekonomů Randalla Henninga a Martina Kesslera. Autoři ve svém článku z roku 2012 hledají v dějinách amerického fiskálního systému lekci pro EU:
"Within the US federal system, the states are “sovereign” with respect to debt. This sovereignty has two facets. On the one hand, the federal government neither mandates nor enforces balanced budget rules for the states. Although states were responding to similar financial problems in similar ways, these rules were adopted autonomously and are implemented independently from the federal government. In modern parlance, states’ “ownership” of these rules is complete. On the other hand, states have no recourse to the federal government when they have difficulty servicing and repaying debt. The federal government assuages funding problems in current expenditures, such as through the ARRA of 2009, but these transfers are largely discretionary and do not relieve state and local governments of debt obligations.
The American constitutional design is thus very different from what European leaders envisage for the euro area: debt brakes that are mandated by the union and enforced by the Commission and the European Court of Justice. The difference is likely to be consequential in two respects. We suspect that local ownership and enforcement make debt brakes more effective than under central mandates, particularly in the context of credible no-bailout norms, and that rules that are centrally mandated are likely to prove to be more brittle than those adopted in a decentralized fashion. When one state violates the rule, as the experience with the Stability and Growth Pact demonstrated, its applicability to other states is less credible. That is less likely to be the case with rules that have been adopted autonomously."
V tomto světle má smysl odmítat fiskální pakt a zároveň požadovat fiskální ústavu.